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Introduction 
The business organisation is central to the functioning of any productive economy.  It 
produces goods and services for consumers and generates wealth in the form of wages, 
profits, interest payments and taxes.  It also imposes costs in the form of investments of 
time, capital and skills and produces externalities such as pollution and urban congestion.  
It then distributes these costs and benefits among the range of constituent groups that are 
in some way connected to the activities of the company.  These ‘stakeholders’ - 
managers, investors, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, communities, the state 
and wider social and economic interests – are bound in a pattern of structured 
relationships, both with each other and the corporate entity itself.  ‘Corporate 
governance’ is broadly defined as ‘the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled’ (Cadbury, 1992:para. 2.5).  This ‘system’ is understood here to refer to the 
rules and other institutions that define stakeholder relationships at the strategic level of 
the business enterprise.  It both shapes and reflects the socially determined purpose of 
corporate activity by allocating strategic decision-making power among stakeholders and 
establishing a framework of rules and incentives within which stakeholder relationships 
are formed and maintained.  
 
Although capitalism has become the dominant mode of production across Europe, 
capitalist relationships generally, and their organisation within the corporation 
specifically, have evolved within distinct national jurisdictions (Zysman, 1983; Albert, 
1993).  In Germany, institutions have evolved that support a pluralist system of corporate 
governance, which balances the interests of stakeholders without necessarily favouring 
any single group.  The UK system, by contrast, establishes the principle of shareholder 
sovereignty, whereby the fundamental aim of the company is to maximise shareholder 
returns.  Section 1 will provide a brief outline of the two contrasting systems 
   3
The process of integrating the economies of Europe has produced a number of legislative 
initiatives that impinge upon national corporate governance regimes.  These fall into the 
policy areas of company law, financial market regulation and employment and social 
policy.  EU rules in the first two categories have increasingly come to reflect Anglo-
Saxon preoccupations with capital market liquidity and the rights of minority 
shareholders, while those in the latter have supported the involvement of employees in 
corporate governance.   The purpose here is to examine the impact of EU rules on the 
national systems of corporate governance in Germany and the UK.  Section 2 will draw 
on the europeanisation literature to identify the mechanisms through which EU policy 
initiatives impact on the national level.  Subsequent sections will then take the examples 
of EU proposals for a takeover directive and rules on employees’ information and 
consultation rights to provide contrasting perspectives on the EU’s impact on the 
corporate governance systems of Germany and the UK respectively.  Commission 
proposals for takeover rules afford a primary role for shareholders in deciding the 
outcome of a bid.  While these have little effect in the UK because of that country’s 
extensive provision for shareholder rights during a takeover bid, they are at odds with 
Germany’s pluralist system of corporate governance.  Section 3 will examine how the 
German system has responded to this pressure.  Section 4 will then examine the impact of 
EU rules that mandate information and consultation rights for workers on the UK’s 
shareholder primacy system.   
 
While Germany’s system of works councils and co-determination make extensive 
provision for the involvement of employees, UK workers have traditionally been 
excluded from corporate decision-making.  Thus, while the German system experiences 
pressure to adjust to the EU’s Anglo-Saxon-oriented takeover directive, the UK is under 
pressure to adapt its corporate governance system to continental practices of worker 
involvement.  This suggests EU pressure for convergence of diverse systems. The 
‘mechanisms of europeanisation’ approach adopted here allows this issue to be 
addressed.  
 
1.  Corporate governance in Germany and the UK   4
Germany 
In Germany, corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small 
number of blockholders.  These usually consist of family owners, other companies that 
are bound in networks of cross-shareholdings, and banks.  Together they account for over 
two thirds of German share ownership (Lannoo, 1999:277).  These blockholders exercise 
close control over their investee companies, usually through board representation
1 and the 
exercise of majority voting rights. The stock market is small and relatively illiquid and 
hostile takeovers are virtually unknown. Banks typically play a significant role in 
industrial finance and this is often matched by the influence they exercise through board 
representation and voting rights derived from their ownership of shares and also by acting 
as proxies for small shareholders.  Pursuing profits for shareholders is not considered to 
be the overriding concern and legal and normative traditions emphasise the social role of 
corporate activity.  Article 14(2) of the German Constitution, for example, establishes the 
principle that ‘(p)roperty imposes duties.  Its use should also serve the public weal’.   
 
The ownership structure of German companies and the financial, legal and normative 
environments in which they operate, encourage ‘patient capital’.  This is reflected in a 
strategic emphasis by corporate management on products and turnover, market share and 
the number of people on the payroll, rather than profits (Schneider-Lenne, 1994:285).  
Blockholders are incentivised to evolve strategies aimed at the long-term growth and 
development of the company by engaging in enduring, trust-based relationships with 
other stakeholders.  While there is a danger of overemphasising the communitarian 
aspects of German corporations (Vitols, 1997), there is a clear emphasis on consensual 
decision-making and collaborative effort among stakeholders, who generally perceive 
their interests to be served best by the long-term growth of the company.  Consequently, 
there is an inclusive approach to stakeholder relationships.  The governance role of 
employees is shaped by the system of co-determination, which grants them up to 50 per 
cent of supervisory board seats, and extensive use of works councils through which 
employee interests are represented in negotiations with management.   
                                                 
1 German companies operate a two-tier board system, made up of a management (Vorstand) and 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).     5
 
UK 
In the UK, share ownership is typically widely dispersed among a large number of (often 
institutional)
2, investors, each of who owns only a small fraction of the total shares of any 
one company.  Although coalitions of shareholders may control, on average, 30 per cent 
of a company’s equity (Franks and Mayer, 2000:3), single investor shareholdings in a 
company usually amount to no more than a few per cent, often much less.   Holdings of 
more than 10 per cent are rare and are generally accounted for by small family-controlled 
companies or those with a significant state interest (Vitols et al, 1997:9).  The evolution 
in the UK of a banking sector that lacks integration with industrial strategy at either the 
macro or micro level (Hutton, 1996; Charkham, 1994:298), leads to a high level of 
dependence of UK companies on equity markets to finance expansion.  But, as La Porta 
et al (2000) point out, minority investors who, due to collective action problems and easy 
exit opportunities are unable/unwilling to exercise direct control, will not be inclined to 
invest unless their interests are adequately protected from rent seeking managers.  
Consequently, UK financial market regulation, company law and self-regulatory 
measures of the corporate sector have developed to reconcile the principle-agency 
difficulties that arise with dispersed ownership.  These focus on the maintenance of liquid 
capital markets, the prevention of expropriation by corporate management, and on 
aligning corporate decision-making with the interests of shareholders by improving 
transparency, disclosure, accountability and the introduction of performance/share-based 
executive pay.  
 
This regime is necessarily underpinned by an ideology of shareholder sovereignty that 
upholds the property rights of shareholders.  The early ‘assimilation of corporate property 
with private individual property’, begun in the Nineteenth Century, continued 
unchallenged throughout most of the Twentieth Century (Donnelly et al, 2000:25).  
Consequently, corporate legislation and case law in the UK are based on the underlying 
premise that a company’s directors have a fiduciary responsibility to run the company in 
the best interests of its shareholders (Wedderburn, Parkinson).  This necessarily denies 
                                                 
2 In the UK, institutional investors account for over two thirds of corporate ownership (Lanoo, 1999:227).   6
the possibility of any pluralist form of governance that accommodates a range of interests 
without giving any one overriding priority.  But it does not deny the possibility that the 
best interests of shareholders (both current and future shareholders) may, in the longer 
term, be consistent with the cultivation of collaborative links with other stakeholders 
(Weddereburn, 1985; Parkinson, 2000; DTI, 2002).  Nevertheless, UK law does not 
mandate this and managers, monitored by shareholders, decide how best to accommodate 
stakeholders’ interests. 
 
Europeanisation 
‘Europeanisation’ is usually envisaged as the impact of European integration on domestic 
policies, politics, polities and identities.  This is seen to occur through a number of 
distinct mechanisms.  Here, the concern is with the pressure experienced in Germany and 
the UK to comply with EU directives on takeovers and employee information and 
consultation rights respectively.  It therefore adopts the familiar ‘misfit – adjustment 
pressure – outcome’ approach (Cowles et al., 2001) that employs the equally familiar 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ metaphors.  EU rules that do not fit well with domestic 
models generate adjustment costs.  In order to minimise these, governments and other 
domestic policy elites seek to upload domestic policy models into the EU policy-making 
and block agreements that would oblige them to download alien rules and practices later.   
 
It is the downloading phase that constitutes europeanisation proper.  This focuses on the 
domestic impact of EU-level agreements.  The domestic response to EU pressure depends 
on two sets of factors.  The first is the size of misfit.  Where EU rules are consistent with 
domestic rules then there is no misfit, domestic systems are under no pressure to adjust 
and there is no europeanisation.  Europeanisation occurs where domestic rules are 
adjusted to comply with EU requirements; that is, there is some degree of misfit to begin 
with and an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.  Where the difference 
between EU and domestic rules is great, then domestic policy elites may oppose their 
national implementation.  In this case, the outcome may be either inertia (where the 
relevant requirement is simply ignored) or retrenchment (where domestic rules are 
reinforced to reaffirm the domestic policy model in the face of EU pressure).  In this   7
understanding, europeanisation is expected to occur most freely when misfit and 
adjustment pressure are only moderate. 
 
But, outcomes are mediated through a number of domestic factors.  These are variously 
identified in the literature (Cowles et al, 2001; Schmidt, 2001) but commonly include: 
policy legacies and reform trajectories that may make it easier or more difficult to 
implement EU rules, the institutional distribution of policy-making power that enables or 
disables potential veto groups, and the existence or otherwise of a cooperative decision-
making culture that encourages cost sharing.  It is through such factors that domestic 
responses to the pressure to adjust to EU rules are shaped. 
 
The Takeover Directive and europeanisation in Germany 
In outsider systems, the threat of hostile takeover plays a key role in aligning managerial 
decision-making with the interests of minority shareholders.  They are usually triggered 
when managerial performance is deemed to be less than optimal in terms of building 
shareholders value.  This provides the opportunity for a bidder to acquire the company, 
install a more efficient management team and then profit from the resulting dividends and 
increase in share price.  The threat of hostile takeover is deemed to discipline managerial 
decision-making according to the norms of shareholder value.  Consequently, outsiders 
will be more willing to invest and incentives for insiders to maintain their dominant 
blockholdings will be diminished (La Porta, 2000).   
 
Proposals for a 13
th Company Law Directive on Takeovers 
The Commission published its first proposal for a 13
th Directive on Company Law 
concerning takeover and other general bids in 1989 (CEEC, 1989).  Noting that the 
incidence of takeovers had increased over the previous 25 years and that their prevalence 
and the rules governing them vary enormously between Member States (op.cit.: 
Explanatory Memorandum, para 8), the aim of the proposal is to ‘afford shareholders and 
other interested parties equivalent standards of protection before the law in all Member 
States’ (op.cit.: para 2). Two provisions in the directive proved crucial for their 
subsequent impact on the German system.  The first was the ‘mandatory bid’ provision of   8
Article 4. This required that once a bidder acquired 33% of the voting rights of the target 
company, an offer must be made for all remaining shares.  The second was Article 8, 
which established the principle of ‘board neutrality’.  This required that the target board 
refrain from taking any action to frustrate a bid without the prior approval of the General 
Meeting of its shareholders.   
 
The 1989 and revised 1990 proposals failed to find agreement in the Council.  A revised 
draft (CEC, 1996) followed the themes of the previous draft but replaced some of its 
detailed requirements (including those concerning the mandatory bid) with a framework 
of common principles together with a number of more general requirements.  However, it 
proved impossible to obtain the necessary level of agreement on this or a subsequent draft 
(CEC, 1997).  Negotiations continued for a further four years and acquired added impetus 
by inclusion of the directive in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP - Lamfalussy, 
2000).  In June 2000, the Council unanimously adopted a Common Position on the draft, 
which was accepted by the Commission a month later.  The European Parliament (EP) 
approved the draft, but only with 15 amendments.  The most controversial item was the 
issue of ‘board neutrality’, opposed primarily by Germany.  The Commission and EP 
eventually agreed a draft but this was then defeated by a German-led coalition in the EP.   
 
The Impact of Proposals for a Takeover Directive on Germany 
The acquisition of companies through public tender offers is not common practice in 
Germany, and hostile bids – those opposed by the target company’s board – are, with rare 
exceptions, unknown.  The first successful hostile bid for a German company by a 
foreign bidder did not occur until 2000, with the Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover.  The 
absence of takeover activity in Germany is explained by the structure of corporate 
governance that presents insiders with both the incentives and mechanisms to avoid 
exposure to unwanted offers.   
 
Yet in 1995, Germany adopted its own voluntary Takeover Code and then six years later, 
following its successful opposition to EU proposals, introduced statutory takeover rules 
that many regarded as an anti takeover law.  These developments in the German takeover   9
regime were influenced in substantial ways by the Commission’s efforts to introduce a 
takeover directive.  The europeanisation of German takeover regulations can be examined 
in two distinct phases.  The first covers the period from the publication of the 
Commission’s first proposal in 1989 to its third draft in 1996.  This was a period of 
modest adjustment by the German system.  The second phase covers the period from the 
1997 draft to just after the 2001 EP vote rejecting the proposal.  This resulted in German 
retrenchment. 
 
1989 to 1996: The Issue of the Mandatory Bid and the German Takeover Code 
Unsurprisingly, corporate insiders – family owners, banks and insurance companies, non-
financial companies involved in cross-shareholdings in interlocking directorships, trade 
unions, and, in some cases, Lander Governments have expressed little interest in rules to 
facilitate takeovers.  Exposure to takeover is seen as a threat to the persistence of major 
family shareholdings, the long-term strategic planning capacity of the company, the 
social end economic plans of regional governments, the stability of profitable industry-
finance relationships and the jobs of employees.  It is true that, prompted by concerns 
about Germany’s image in international capital markets, the Ministry of Finance 
authorised the Stock Exchange Experts’ Committee (SEEC) to publish ‘Guiding 
Principles’ for takeovers in 1979.  But these merely consisted of a few non-binding 
principles that had no discernable impact on takeover activity (Thoma, 1997).  Thus, 
from the point of view of the dominant German elites, the Commission’s first proposals 
for a takeover directive in 1989 and 1990 were at best anomalous, but, at worst, had the 
potential to disrupt established insider relationships.   
 
Yet, despite the failure of the proposals and despite also the lack of any demand from 
domestic elites for more comprehensive takeover rules, the German Ministry of Finance 
instructed the SEEC to review its 1979 Guidelines and make recommendations for 
reform.  The result was the publication in 1995 of the German Takeover Code 
(Ubernahmekodex).  In all respects bar one, this demonstrates a high degree of   10
compliance with the failed directive.
3  The exception was the mandatory bid requirement 
of Article 4.  The aim of this provision is to protect the financial rights of minority 
shareholders by preventing blockholders from negotiating a transfer of control among 
themselves at one price then offering minorities a reduced price (or no offer at all) once 
control is achieved.  This is at odds with the German system of insider control, which 
permits control to change hands with the acquisition of only 20 or 30 per cent of the 
stock.  The mandatory bid requirement of the German Code is therefore less stringent.  
Although it requires that a mandatory bid be made once a certain threshold is reached, it 
allows for circumstances in which this may be deferred for either 18 or 21 months.  
Importantly, it sets the threshold that would trigger a mandatory bid at 50%.  Given the 
ownership and control structures of German companies, this would allow control to 
change hands before the threshold is reached, thereby avoiding the obligation to make a 
bid for the remaining shares.   
 
Given the Commission’s continued commitment to a takeover directive, despite the 
failure of the 1990 proposal, the German Code can be seen as a defensive response to 
those intentions, in particular the mandatory bid requirement.  While many of the other 
requirements of the 1990 proposal did not present any difficulties of ‘fit’ with existing 
German rules and could be absorbed, the mandatory bid requirement could not.  The 
introduction of a weaker mandatory bid requirement into the code seems to have served 
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Commission.  By establishing a takeover 
code (albeit non-statutory) that complied with all other major provisions of the directive, 
German representatives would be in a better position to negotiate a compromise on the 
mandatory bid provision (Faylor, 1998:35). 
 
The strategy seems to have had some effect.  The German Code became effective on 
October 1 1994, four months before the publication of the EU’s revised draft (CEC, 
1996).  This made two concessions to the German position on the mandatory bid.  First, 
the new proposal allowed for alternative mechanisms to the mandatory bid (Art. 3).  
                                                 
3 Based on comparison of the directive with translation and commentary on German Code by Thoma, 
(1997, 1998); Faylor (1998).   11
German negotiators had argued that the detailed provisions of its Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz) provided extensive protections for minorities (Faylor, 1998:35; Baums, 
1996) and that these combined with Article 16 of the Code provided equivalent minority 
protections to the requirements of the proposed 13
th Directive (Baums, 1996:4). Second, 
the 1996 proposal drops the requirement of the earlier proposal that a mandatory bid be 
triggered once a 33% threshold is reached.  Instead, it devolves responsibility for 
determining the threshold to the supervisory authority of each Member State (CEC, 1996: 
Art. 3.2).  Thus, as a result of successful uploading, the misfit created by earlier proposals 
was diminished.  The 1996 draft was viewed favourably in Germany by both Parliament 
and industry associations (Baums, 1996:1) and opposition was dropped.  The outcome of 
this was that Germany now had a voluntary Code governing takeovers that was fully 
consistent with the failed directive. 
 
1997 to 2001: Board Neutrality, New Misfit and German Retrenchment 
However, German support for the directive did not last.  By the end of the decade, the 
board neutrality provision in the directive was becoming problematic for German elites.  
Article 8a (CEC, 1997) requires that Member States introduce rules that prevent boards 
from taking action to frustrate a bid unless they have the approval of the General Meeting 
of shareholders convened specifically for that purpose.  This requirement is part of the 
array of rules designed to resolve principle-agent problems that arise in widely held 
systems.  But in Germany where ownership is concentrated, dominant shareholders 
exercise close control over the board so the principle-agent issue does not arise.  This 
makes a rule to ensure board neutrality during a bid superfluous as the board is rarely in a 
position to act independently of the interests of the dominant shareholders.  
Consequently, since the publication of the first draft in 1989, German negotiators had not 
opposed this provision.  But, by the end of the 1990s, the board neutrality requirement 
was seen as a major problem for the German system.  What had changed were the 
orientations of key policy actors as a result of domestic rule changes that were unwinding 
the more traditional German defence mechanisms.   
   12
By the mid 1990s, growing perceptions of economic underperformance and a number of 
high profile scandals and corporate failures prompted a German reform agenda aimed at 
improving supervisory structures and facilitating companies’ access to capital by 
modernising securities markets.  This took the form of the Control and Transparency Act 
(1997).  Its aim was to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in line with the 
needs of emerging capital markets but without fundamentally altering its structure 
(Cioffi, 2002).  Importantly, it introduced reforms that, while aiming to stimulate 
developments of German securities markets, as well as diminish the governance role of 
banks, eroded traditional German takeover defences (ibid.).  It removed the option for 
voting caps and established a ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle; it sought to encourage the 
banks to reduce their corporate equity stakes; and it prohibited the voting of cross-
shareholding stakes above 25% for supervisory board elections (Seibert, 1999).  These 
rule changes, together with the removal of the 50% capital gains tax on the sale of 
corporate shareholdings by the 2000 tax reform, led to expectations of extensive 
corporate restructuring as banks and non-financial companies sought to divest themselves 
of their unwanted holdings (Business Week, 10/01/2000; Europe, 10/2001).   
 
Nevertheless, the reforms enjoyed fairly broad domestic support.  The major German 
banks were increasingly concerned to cast off their hausebank role and compete in global 
investment banking markets (Gordon, 2003) and had been lobbying German governments 
for just such measures (Business Week, 10/01/2000).  Similarly, the large, globally 
oriented manufacturers were seeking such reforms to facilitate their global restructuring 
ambitions (ibid.).  The financial sector was also a beneficiary of the new policies.  The 
tax reform was not only aimed at facilitating corporate restructuring.  Its other purpose 
was to invigorate German securities markets by increasing the proportion of shares traded 
(Cioffi, 2002:34).  On the day the reforms were announced, the DAX Index gained nearly 
2% and the stock prices of Deutsche and Dresdner Banks rose between 3 and 6 percent 
(Sunday Business Post, 2001).  Although, the reforms were essentially neo-liberal in 
origin (Cioffi, 2002:35), the political left was relatively quiescent and the union 
organisations pronounced them ‘tolerable’ (Business Week, 10/01/2000).  They had been   13
won round by the Schroder government’s presentation of the reforms as essential for 
growth and jobs (The Times, 14/07/2000).   
 
Thus, despite the fact that the reforms significantly eroded the future capacity of German 
companies to protect themselves from takeover, a broad base of support was evident.  
The 2000 takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone demonstrated the vulnerability of 
widely held companies (Europe, 10/2001: 22) but even here opposition to the bid, whilst 
highly vocal and public, did not lead to a backlash against the reform programme or lead 
to demand for rules to reconstitute German defences (Cioffi, 2002).  Here, the EU’s 
impending takeover directive appears to have played a significant role. 
 
Concern among corporate elites was that the board neutrality requirement of the proposed 
directive would now make German companies asymmetrically vulnerable to takeover 
(Cioffi, 2002).  The directive would prevent the board of the offeree company from 
taking frustrating action against a bidder unless it had the approval of shareholders.  
Domestic reforms were expected to accelerate the dispersal of corporate ownership of 
German companies and the Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover had amply demonstrated 
that the interests of dispersed (often foreign) shareholders do not necessarily coincide 
with the traditional concerns of Deutschland AG.  Therefore, the provision to allow the 
board to attempt to frustrate the bid with the consent of shareholders did not allay fears.  
With the possible break-up of the controlling blocks of shares, it was perfectly feasible 
that minority shareholders would carry the vote against a board seeking to engage in 
defensive action.   
 
The defensive actions a board might take include the ‘poison pill’, selling off key assets, 
reshaping the capital structure, ‘tin parachute agreements’ and the ‘Pac Man’ defence 
(Gordon, 2002 for detail).  These have never been employed in Germany and their 
legality under German law is uncertain anyway (ibid.).  Nevertheless, domestic reforms 
had removed the availability of more traditional measures and were beginning to unwind 
the system of cross-shareholdings that supported the insider system of control.  And now 
the EU directive was threatening to remove remaining (albeit untested) defensive options.    14
Moreover, as German negotiators were to point out, the EU proposal did not prohibit 
defence mechanisms that German law had outlawed but were still used in other Member 
States, such as golden shares and multiple voting rights.   
 
Despite this, the German government remained a supporter of the proposal and in June 
2000 the Council unanimously agreed a Common Position on the draft.  In the domestic 
sphere, a statutory replacement for the Takeover Code was being developed alongside 
negotiations in Europe in the expectation that agreement would soon be reached (Cioffi, 
2002).  The June 2000 draft of the domestic Act demonstrates a high degree of 
compliance with the EU proposal (Weber-Rey, 2000 for summary of 2000 draft).  But, 
during the following nine months, the growing anxiety of corporate elites in the wake of 
the Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover and the potential consequences of domestic reform 
found clear focus on the 13
th directive.  There was a growing perception that the board 
neutrality requirement would constitute a significant threat to vested corporate interests 
and the consensual industrial model itself.  While the unions saw a more liberal takeover 
regime as a shift in the balance of power from employees to shareholders and as a means 
of imposing restructuring costs onto the workforce, managers perceived threats to their 
position as incumbents and the future of corporate Germany generally (Cioffi, 2002: 38).  
This prompted the formation of an industrial coalition of management, unions and the 
government of Lower Saxony to press the German government and members of the 
European Parliament to oppose or substantially reform the directive (FT, 2/5/01; 6/7/01).  
Despite agreement being reached in a special conciliation committee inn June 2001, the 
proposal was defeated by a tied vote in the European Parliament one month later.  
 
Immediately following the failure of the EU directive, Chancellor Schroder announced 
his intention to finalise a takeover regulation that would permit boards to oppose a bid 
without shareholder approval (FT, 6/7/01).  In November that year, an amended draft was 
passed by the German Parliament and the Securities, Acquisitions and Takeover Act 
(Wertpapiererwerbs und Ubernahmegesetz – hereafter TOA) came into force on 1 
January 2002.  In all fundamental respects, bar one, it demonstrates a high degree of   15
compliance with the requirements of the failed directive
4   Following the European 
Parliament vote, a last minute change to the proposed TOA made it permissible for a 
board to take defensive action without the approval of shareholders – in stark contrast to 
both the failed directive and earlier drafts of the TOA and the TOC it was to replace 
(above).  Section 33 of the TOA establishes board neutrality as the default position but 
then allows the board to engage in defensive action providing that it has the approval of 
the supervisory board (Lovells, 2002).   
 
Thus, the misfit between the board neutrality provision of the proposed directive and the 
German system of corporate control prompted the mobilisation of domestic elites.  The 
directive provided a focal point of opposition for traditional elements of corporate 
Germany whose anxieties about the apparent move towards shareholder capitalism had 
been growing for some time.  This resulted in defeat of the directive and the enactment 
on Germany of draconian anti-takeover legislation. 
 
The UK and EU Rules on Employee Information and Consultation Rights 
The involvement of workers in decisions that affect their interests is an intrinsic feature 
of European models of corporate governance.  ‘Involvement’ takes the form of 
information and consultation rights and sometimes also participation rights, usually 
through representation on the board.  With the exception of the UK and Ireland, the 
national regulations of the remaining thirteen Member States make employee information 
and consultation a matter of legal right (CEC, 1998: Annex, Table1).  Seven of them also 
make provision for employee participation through board representation (Davignon, 
1997: para. 76). 
 
In the UK’s shareholder primacy model, underpinned by a dominant property rights 
theory of the company, the extent to which the interests of other stakeholders can be 
accommodated is necessarily limited (Wedderburn, 1985; Parkinson, 2000).  The relative 
absence of ‘committed capital’ and the short-term horizons of the stock market have 
encouraged the commoditisation of work: low wages, low skills and flexible labour 
                                                 
4 Based on comparisons with translation of German Act by Lovells (2002)   16
markets, leading in turn to polarised and adversarial industrial relations (Hutton, 1996).  
The result of this is that neither side of industry has ever seen much advantage in the 
development of inclusive corporate structures or collaborative industrial relations.  
Labour and Union leaderships in Britain have traditionally been distrustful of workplace 
cooperation (Beesley and Evans, 1978) and nationalisation rather than company law has 
been seen as the best means of advancing the interests of workers (see for example, 
Crosland, 1967; Donelly et al, 2000).   
 
Thus, E/EC directives aimed at establishing minimum standards of involvement across 
Europe have created implementation difficulties in the UK.  Four pieces of legislation 
make up the EU regime for the corporate involvement of employees.  The 1975 Directive 
on Collective Redundancies (CEEC, 1975)
5 requires an employer to begin consultations 
with employee representatives with a view to exploring other options, minimising the 
number of redundancies and developing procedures for redeploying or retraining workers 
affected.  The directive on business transfers (CEEC, 1977)
6 aims to safeguard the rights 
of employees in the event of a transfer of ownership
7 by establishing information rights 
and ensuring that the employee obligations of the employer are transferred to the new 
employer.  The European Works Council Directive (CEC, 1994) requires the 
establishment of European-level works councils to improve the information and 
consultation rights of employees in community scale undertakings.
8  Finally, the 
Information and Consultation Framework (ICF) Directive (CEC, 2002) seeks to establish 
minimum standards of employee involvement on an EU-wide basis. This applies to 
undertakings employing at least 50 and establishments employing at least 20 workers in 
any Member State.  It requires employees to be given information concerning the 
economic situation of the company and probable developments, especially those that 
affect employment and changes to the organisation of work (Art. 4(2)(a-c)).  
Consultations should be timely and at the appropriate managerial level; management 
must be responsive to employee opinions and consultations must be conducted with a 
                                                 
5 Amended by 92/56/EEC and consolidated by 98/59/EC. 
6 Amended by 98/50/EC and consolidated by 2001/23/EC. 
7 It applies only to ‘legal transfers of mergers’; that is, it does not apply to transfers of ownership that result 
from share acquisition (see Art. 1(1)). 
8 Those with at least 1,000 employees in the EU and 150 or more in at least two Member States (Art. 2(a)).   17
view to reaching agreement (Art 4(4)(a-e)).  The directive, however, leaves national 
governments free to define the practical arrangements for ensuring the provision of 
information and consultation rights in accordance with national law and industrial 
relations practice.   
 
Implementation in the UK 
E/EC information and consultation rules have created continual adjustment difficulties 
for UK policy makers.  Although the two earliest directives only grant information and 
consultation rights in the specific instances of collective redundancies and business 
transfer, both were opposed by UK policy-makers.  It was not until after a 1995 ECJ 
ruling (ECJ, 1994) against the UK government that domestic laws on collective 
redundancies were brought into line with the requirement of the directives, first 
introduced twenty years earlier (CEC, 1999).  Similarly, in the case of the business 
transfer directive, a satisfactory level of implementation was only achieved in the UK 
following a formal notice of complaint from the Commission in 1989 and a ‘Reasoned 
Opinion’ in 1991 concerning the lack of implementation (CEC, 1992).   
 
In 1992, the Conservative government, headed by John Major, negotiated an opt-out from 
the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty.  The Social Chapter was to provide the basis 
for measures to offset the potentially adverse social consequences of the single market 
and monetary union.  But, for the Conservative government of the time, this was seen as 
a reversal of over a decade of reforms under Thatcher, aimed at promoting supply side 
policies and forcing businesses to take decisions to promote their profitability.  The EWC 
Directive was based on the Social Chapter and therefore did not apply to the UK when it 
was adopted in 1994.   
 
The opt-out, however, at least as far as the EWC directive is concerned, was of more 
symbolic than practical significance for the involvement of employees in UK companies.  
First, the directive would only have applied to those companies or groups that had a 
significant European dimension (around 300 in total).  Second, many of these companies 
already had extensive experience of works councils through branches in countries whose   18
national rules made them mandatory.  Third, many of the UK companies that were 
‘exempted’ by the opt-out were nevertheless subject to the requirements of the directive 
by virtue of their branches or subsidiaries located in Member States that were 
implementing the directive.  The opt-out simply meant that European scale companies 
were obliged, under the terms of the directive, to establish European-level works councils 
for their continental workers: their UK workers could be excluded from participation.  
Most affected companies decided to include their UK employees anyway (The Times, 
23/9/96).   
 
The opt-out, however, was of huge political significance and was widely acclaimed in the 
Conservative press.  The notion of information and consultation rights for employees did 
not fit well with the dominant property rights model of companies.  With the exception of 
the industrial democracy debate of the 1970s that led to the Bullock Committee, the 
manager-shareholder relationship was always the prime focus of concern (see,for 
example, Cohen, 1945; Jenkins, 1962; Cadbury, 1992).  The idea of the company as an 
association, whose internal structures could be altered in order to pursue pragmatic 
compromises between capital and labour, was largely absent from the British debate 
(Donelly, 2000:10).  However, during the 1990s, the ideological and theoretical 
landscape began to shift and stakeholder issues entered mainstream debate. 
 
The new decade saw the emergence of debates that reflected on the corporate excesses of 
the 1980s and the economic and social consequences of the endemic short-termism of 
British industrial finance.  By the mid-90s, a number of influential reports had been 
published that associated the underperformance of UK companies (especially when 
compared to their German and Japanese counterparts) with a lack of long-term planning 
and neglect of stakeholder relationships (DTI, 1994; RSA, 1995; IPPR, 1997).   
A number of leading journalists (Hutton, 1996; Plender, 1997), academics (Kay, 1994; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Blair, 1995) and Labour activists (Mitchell and Sikka, 1996) 
were also sending the same message.  The elections of John Monks and Tony Blair – 
both arch modernisers (Taylor, 2000) – as leaders of the TUC and Labour Party 
respectively, saw each of them engage with the stakeholder debate as a means of   19
realigning their respective organisations.  Realising that even should Labour form a 
future government, the restoration of pre-Thatcher union rights was not going to occur
9, 
the TUC based its future strategy of workplace modernisation on the European concept of 
industrial partnership (ibid.).   For New Labour, the stakeholder idea dovetailed nicely 
with its electoral strategy of winning the middle ground without alienating its more 
traditional support.  Its inclusive theme suggested a remedy for the divisiveness of the 
Thatcher legacy, while providing a dynamic alternative to the perceived drift of the Major 
Government (Plender, 1997:212).  The stakeholder idea subsequently became the motif 
of ‘New Labour’s’ 1997 election manifesto.  The change of government in 1997 was 
decisive in shifting the ideological ground.  The EWC was no longer unacceptable and 
one of the first tasks of the new government was to end the opt-out and sign up to the 
EWC directive (CEC, 1997a), which became effective in the UK in January 2000 
 
Nevertheless, the EU’s intention to introduce legislation that would oblige all companies 
with more than 50 employees to establish permanent information and consultation 
procedures was vigorously opposed by the Labour government.  This requirement is not 
incompatible with the UK’s corporate governance regime.  In its Final Report, the 
Steering Committee of the CLR recommended a statutory codification of directors’ duties 
that did not significantly alter the position established by case law (above).  Accepting 
this, the government stated that subsequent legislation should be based on the principle 
that: 
The basic goal for directors should be the success of the company in the 
collective best interests of shareholders, but that directors should also 
recognise, as the circumstances require, the company’s need to foster 
relationships with its employees, customers and suppliers … (DTI, 
2002: 3.3). 
But, while UK law does not prevent directors from accommodating the interests of 
employees, and even encourages this where it serves the best interests of the company 
and its shareholders, a fundamental principle is that it is directors, under a fiduciary 
obligation to shareholders, who are in the best position to decide the most appropriate 
                                                 
9 As shadow employment minister, Blair had used the provision of the EEC’s Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights, that established the principle of individual choice with respect to union membership, to deter 
TUC calls for a future Labour government to restore closed shop agreements (Taylor, 2000).   20
way of incorporating the interests of other stakeholders.  Consequently, the directive’s 
mandatory provision of information and consultation rights for employees presented a 
case of moderate misfit.   
 
Under pressure to maintain its business friendly image and amid signs of a business 
backlash against government and EU regulation, especially in the area of employment 
law (Economist, 19/8/2000), the Labour Government vigorously opposed the directive.  
In a coalition with, among others, Germany, the Labour Government successfully 
blocked the directives’ progress for over three years.  When Germany withdrew from the 
blocking coalition, the UK negotiated transitional arrangements that would allow its 
implementation to be phased in over a number of years for smaller companies.   
 
Conclusion 
National systems of corporate governance are based on deeply embedded institutions.  In 
Germany, the company is perceived as a social institution that balances a range of 
stakeholder interests.  Ownership is concentrated and stability of control is facilitated by 
cross-shareholdings and a system of co-determination that grants supervisory board 
representation to employee representatives.  In the UK, the company is seen more as a 
vehicle for the pursuit of profits for shareholders.  Shareholder primacy is supported by 
case law and statute, together with liquid capital markets and a liberal takeover regime.  
Both systems have faced EU rules that do not fit well with their respective systems of 
corporate governance.  Proposed takeover rules would have shifted the balance of power 
to minority shareholders in the German system and undermined traditional systems of 
insider control.  Conversely, in the UK, EU rules that mandate information and 
consultation rights for employees are at odds with a system that sees the pursuit of 
shareholder value as the overriding objective.   
 
Germany’s 1995 Takeover Code represents a case of modest adjustment to EU proposals.  
In most respects, the 1990 proposals created little misfit for the German system and could 
be absorbed comfortably.  The mandatory bid requirement did not fit well and was only 
very partially absorbed.  The introduction in Germany of the Takeover Code at this time   21
was significant.  It allowed German negotiators bargain effectively and win important 
concessions on the mandatory bid requirement.  Successful German uploading in this 
area resulted in a more watered down version of the EU’s proposals that reduced 
domestic misfit and facilitated absorption.   
 
During the second half of the 1990s, a domestic reform programme in Germany took 
development of the German corporate governance model in a direction the made the 
board neutrality provision of EU proposals increasingly problematic.  Despite intense 
negotiations, revisions to the draft did not sufficiently reduce misfit.  The board neutrality 
provision of the proposed directive had become a focal point of opposition and served to 
mobilise domestic industrial elites who were able to exert sufficient pressure to 
successfully oppose the directive.  In the domestic sphere, this resulted in retrenchment 
through the enactment of legislation that sanctioned autonomous defensive actions by the 
boards of target companies.   
 
In the UK, pressure to adjust to European information and consultation rules was met 
initially by inertia.  It took twenty years for the UK to achieve an acceptable level of 
compliance with directives on collective redundancies and business transfers; then only 
following additional pressure from the Commission, which included an ECJ ruling.  The 
EWC Directive was more important for its political symbolism than its actual impact on 
companies.  Many of UK companies that fell within its scope despite the opt-out 
absorbed its requirements fairly comfortably.  The political misfit was diminished by the 
election of a Labour government pursuing a reform agenda that engaged positively with 
the stakeholder debate.  The Information and Consultation Framework Directive, 
however, applied to all companies employing more than 50 and was seen as out of step 
with the principle that it is for managers, monitored by and held accountable to 
shareholders, to judge how best to develop relationships with stakeholder groups, such as 
employees.  Unlike the German case, UK negotiators were unable to block the directive 
and, although some concessions have been negotiated, its central provisions must now be 
transposed into UK law.   
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Thus, while adjustment pressure in Germany resulted in retrenchment, the UK is obliged 
to adjust to EU requirements.  The explanation of these different outcomes lies in both 
the extent of misfit and mediating factors found in domestic arenas.  The board neutrality 
provision of the takeover directive was substantially at odds with core institutions of the 
German model.  Domestic reforms had gone some way towards eroding the ability of 
boards to defend against hostile takeovers.  But these reforms were limited in their 
impact.  They were designed to modernise the existing system, not transform it.  In the 
context of these reforms, the board neutrality provision of the takeover directive had the 
potential to leave boards powerless against the wishes of outsider/minority investors.  It 
was therefore conceivable that the collective impact of domestic reforms and the EU 
directive would substantially undermine the insider system of control upon which 
German corporate governance is founded.   
 
In the case of the UK, the requirements of the ICF Directive establish a framework for 
the development of cooperative industrial relations based on partnership rather than 
conflict.  This is significant and may ultimately lead to far reaching changes in industrial 
relations (Hutton).  But it is not transformative with respect to corporate governance. 
Case law establishes that directors are entitled (perhaps even obliged) to take into account 
the interests of employees where this is consistent with the best interests of the company 
and its shareholders.  This position is confirmed by the White Paper that resulted from the 
findings of the Company Law Review.  Offering information and consultation rights to 
employees is consistent with this.  Misfit does occur by making such rights mandatory.  
This is inconsistent with the principle that it is managers, held to account by shareholders, 
who should decide how best to accommodate the interests of employees.  But this is 
hardly a core institution.  The mandatory provision of information and consultation rights 
does not challenge the notion of shareholder primacy or the institutions of company law, 
case law, capital markets and the takeover regime that support it.  Thus, while the board 
neutrality provision of the takeover directive was incompatible with the core institutions 
that underpinned the German system of insider control, the mandatory provision of 
information and consultation rights for employees in the UK does not challenge core 
institutions and therefore presents a more manageable degree of misfit.     23
 
While in both cases, EU rules were consistent with domestic reform trajectories, the 
interaction with domestic politics occurred differently.  In Germany, there is a strong 
perception of a common industrial interest among company managers, key shareholders, 
union representatives and regional government who have a tradition of collaborative 
activity.  This, together with a political structure that favours veto groups, enabled 
powerful and ultimately decisive opposition to emerge.  In the UK, conversely, the 
Information and Consultation Directive was divisive.  It was supported by the unions and 
opposed by business groups.  The relative absence of a common industrial interest, 
together with a political structure that disadvantages veto groups, prevented more 
effective domestic opposition from emerging.   
 
Thus, EU rules appear to be exerting pressure towards convergence.  The proposed 
takeover directive sought to empower minority shareholders in the governance of 
companies by making them the ultimate arbiters of the success or otherwise of a takeover 
bid.  Thus, a central Anglo-Saxon principle has been adopted at the EU level and, for a 
time at least, pressure exerted for its EU-wide adoption.  The ICF Directive mandates 
information and consultation rights for employees.  And this strand of the European 
social market model has been implanted in the Anglo-Saxon system of the UK.   While 
the extent of misfit between the takeover proposals and the German systems exerted too 
much pressure and resulted in German retrenchment, the ICF Directive presented only 
moderate misfit for the UK and led to adjustment.   In line with expectations, this 
suggests the capacity of EU rules to bring about convergence of deeply embedded 
national corporate governance systems through adjustment pressure is limited to 
incremental changes which do not challenge core institutions. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
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